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A leading explanation of long run U.S. inﬂation trends attributes
both the fall of inﬂation in the 1980s and the subsequent years of low
and stable inﬂation to well run monetary policy pinning down inﬂation-
ary expectations. Most other OECD economies experienced a similar
rise and fall of inﬂation, as well as subsequent low and stable inﬂation
over the same period. This observation has been under-explored in the
literature. In this paper we exploit the international dimension of the
fall of inﬂation to investigate the hypothesis that good monetary policy
is responsible for recent inﬂation outcomes. Our results suggest that
this theory is not compatible with the cross country data.
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U.S. inﬂation was low in the early 1960s and rose through the late 1960s and
1970s before falling through the 1980s, and remaining low thereafter. There
is an extensive literature that attempts to explain why U.S. inﬂation rose in
the 1970s and then fell in the 1980s.1 The most prominent theory may be the
one suggested by New Keynesian theory and put forth by Clarida, Gal´ ı and
Gertler (2000), which gives a key role to agents’ expectations of inﬂation. A
major problem in this literature, however, is that all major competing theories
are broadly consistent with the U.S. data, so that debates often boil down to
researchers’ beliefs over the plausibility of various identiﬁcation schemes and
reﬁnements in econometric technique.2 These debates are diﬃcult to resolve
in the absence of new data.
The pattern of rising inﬂation in the 1970s, falling inﬂation in the 1980s
and low and stable inﬂation thereafter was not isolated to the U.S., however.
A similar pattern occurred across OECD countries.3 A common pattern to
OECD inﬂation outcomes strongly suggests a common cause, which implies
that a successful explanation of the so-called Great Inﬂation should apply
across OECD countries. We exploit this observation by employing a multi-
country approach to evaluate the hypothesis that recent years of low and stable
inﬂation are the result of good monetary policy pinning down inﬂationary
expectations.
While this, New Keynesian explanation concerns both the rise and fall of
inﬂation, we focus on the more recent period. This is for two main reasons:
i) describing monetary policy via a monetary policy reaction function is a
common practice in this literature, and applying this approach across OECD
countries is more defensible in recent years than in earlier decades, and ii)
1Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gerlter (2000), Sargent (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2005, 2001),
Sims and Zha (2006), Orphanides (2004, 2003, 2002), Ireland (1999), Primiceri (2006).
2See for example the exchange between Benati and Surico (2009) and Canova (2007), or
Cochrane’s (2007) critique of the literature.
3Previous authors have come to a similar conclusion. For example, see Rogoﬀ (2003),
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2008), and Mumtaz and Surico (2008), Monacelli and Sala (2009),
and Doyle & Falk (2008, 2010).
1the theory suggests that the rise of inﬂation was due to indeterminacy caused
by poor monetary policy, which allowed for self fulﬁlling expectations of high
inﬂation. Identiﬁcation of monetary policy rule parameters is more diﬃcult
when multiple equilibria are possible, so we limit our results to the more recent
period where we have more conﬁdence about what our empirical results are
measuring.
Our paper starts out by documenting the key observation that low fre-
quency movements in OECD inﬂation rates are strongly correlated across
countries. In addition to presenting simple plots of inﬂation, we use the dy-
namic correlation measure of Croux, Forni, and Reichlin (2001) to measure
the correlation between time series in the frequency domain. Using this ap-
proach we show that OECD inﬂation rates are highly correlated with each
other, with the strongest correlation at low frequencies. In other words, the
results conﬁrm that the rise and fall of inﬂation was indeed an OECD-wide
phenomenon.
We then turn to the main question of the paper, which is whether or not
the New Keynesian theory of monetary policy improvements can explain the
OECD-wide fall of inﬂation and subsequent low inﬂation. This view asserts
that errors in monetary policy allowed a rise in inﬂation in the 1970s because
central bankers, in violation of the so-called Taylor principle, failed to increase
real interest rates in the face of rising inﬂationary expectations, thereby vali-
dating those expectations. The inﬂationary episode ended in the 1980s when
policy makers adopted policies that reacted in a more contractionary way in
the face of inﬂationary expectations. The subsequent adherence to these poli-
cies resulted in a long period of low and stable inﬂation that has lasted from
the early or mid 1980s to the present.
We test this theory by estimating a monetary policy reaction function based
on the widely used Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)) that relates central banks’ nom-
inal interest rate decisions to an output gap and a measure of expected inﬂa-
tion. We follow Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) by using GMM to estimate
policy reaction functions across OECD countries for the more recent period,
when inﬂation has been either falling or low and stable. We ask whether the
2estimated parameters are in the region that New Keynesian theory suggests
they must be in order to not accommodate inﬂationary expectations.
We focus on the most recent period for two reasons. First, it is more rea-
sonable to apply a Taylor rule framework to recent data as the conduct of
monetary policy has converged more closely on a common framework. Prior
to the early 1980s, policy makers used a number of instruments, price and
wage controls for example, as tools of monetary policy. Institutional arrange-
ments concerning monetary policy, in particular the use of short run nominal
interest rates as a main tool of policy, are much better described by a Taylor
type policy reaction function in the period after the early 1980s than before.
Furthermore, from an empirical perspective, standard Taylor-type policy rules
describe monetary policy in other OECD countries about as well as in the U.S.
for the post-1980 period.4
Second, and more importantly, we look at the more recent period because
of the problem of accurately and properly identifying monetary policy pa-
rameters in forward looking models, particularly when using one equation or
partial information approaches, as noted by Cochrane (2007). Recent research
suggests that when the Taylor rule parameters are in the determinacy region,
where monetary policy does not accommodate inﬂationary expectations, single
equation estimation methods can identify the policy rule parameters, as long
as the economy exhibits inﬂation and/or output persistence (Carillo (2008)).5
Less is known about how to identify monetary parameters in the indeterminacy
region, where policy accommodates inﬂationary expectations.
Carillo (2008) uses a Monte Carlo approach to evaluate the ability of single
equation approaches to accurately identify monetary policy rule parameters.
For simplicity, however, he restricts attention to the case of backwards looking
policy reaction functions, that express interest rate decisions as a function of
contemporaneous values of inﬂation and the output gap. Our objective in
4See Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gerlter (1998), for example.
5Actual data displays both kinds of persistence, and research extensions of New Key-
nesian theory focuses on building models consistent with these features of the data. For
examples, see McCallum and Nelson (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Mankiw
and Reis (2002), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
3this paper, however, requires us to estimate a forward looking policy rule in
which monetary policy responds to expected future inﬂation. We therefore
ﬁrst employ Carillo’s approach to show that a GMM approach can identify
the policy parameters in a forward looking policy reaction function.
We then conduct our test of the theory by estimating monetary policy
reaction functions for the recent period.6 If the theory is correct, and the
parameters are in the determinacy region, then our Monte Carlo results suggest
that we are able to identify these parameters correctly. The restriction we test
is that policy satisﬁes the Taylor principle, which says that policy should
respond to increases in expected inﬂation by increasing the nominal interest
rate by more than the increase in expected inﬂation, so that the real interest
rate rises. In other words, that the coeﬃcient on expected inﬂation in the
monetary policy rule exceeds one.
We view our approach as representing a fairly weak test of the theory, for
three reasons. First, we are only testing the implications of the theory con-
cerning the fall of inﬂation, rather than requiring it to explain both the rise
and the fall. Also, when monetary policy parameters are in the indeterminacy
region the economy may produce identical dynamics to the case where these
parameters are in the determinacy region. In this case, it may appear that
monetary policy satisﬁed the Taylor principle when in fact it did not. Fi-
nally, when trend inﬂation is positive, satisfying the Taylor principle requires
increasing nominal interest rates by substantially more than the increase in
expected inﬂation (i.e. the coeﬃcient on expected inﬂation in the monetary
policy rule is substantially larger than one). This eﬀect is particularly pro-
nounced when the policy reaction function is forward looking. In this paper,
we assume that trend inﬂation is zero, thus making it much easier to satisfy
the Taylor principle compared to cases where trend inﬂation is positive.7
In spite of employing a relatively weak test of the theory, our main ﬁnding is
6We employ two approaches to determine where the recent period starts: i) we use
turning points in inﬂation identiﬁed by previous researchers, and ii) we use a common date
thought to correspond with changes in the U.S. monetary policy regime.
7Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010).
4that the there is little evidence that the Taylor principle was satisﬁed for most
countries in the recent period. In fact, we ﬁnd that the theory ﬁts the data
for the U.S., but only for two or three of the other 13 countries in our sample
(depending on the method of estimation used). We view the combination
of a relatively lax test and little evidence in favor of the theory as strongly
suggestive of the implication that the theory cannot explain the fall of inﬂation
observed in OECD countries.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we document inﬂation trends in
14 OECD countries, and argue that they share common features. In Section 3
we present the empirical and theoretical framework along with our discussion
of the identiﬁcation problem. In Section 4 we present the main results. In
Section 5 we oﬀer concluding comments.
2 Inﬂation Trends
In this section we argue that inﬂation patterns in OECD countries over the
past 4 decades closely mirror the well known patterns of U.S. inﬂation. Our
measure of inﬂation is the annualized quarterly percentage change in the Con-
sumer Price Index (as reported in the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators).8
We present the data for a sample of 14 countries.
Figures 1-3 plot annualized inﬂation rates derived from quarterly CPI data
for 14 countries. While the pattern of inﬂation is visible in the raw data, we
present the 9 quarter centered moving average of inﬂation to smooth out the
higher frequency movements in the data. To facilitate comparison, each ﬁgure
also includes the moving average of U.S. inﬂation (the dotted line).
The main observation for the ﬁgures is that inﬂation starts out relatively
low in the early 1960s in all countries. This is followed by a period of rising
inﬂation lasting until the late 1970s or early 1980s. After this period of rising,
inﬂation rates then fall until the present, and are generally as low or lower by
8The observation that inﬂation trends are common across countries is robust to the use
of the quarterly GDP deﬂator as the price series for those countries for which a suﬃciently
long sample of quarterly national accounts data is available.
5the end of the 1990s than they were in the early 1960s.
The main exceptions to the pattern are Germany, Japan and Switzerland.
Each of these countries did experience a rise of inﬂation in the early to mid
1970s. However, inﬂation quickly fell back to low levels in each of these coun-
tries. These countries represent some cross sectional variation in inﬂation
trends. Even in these countries, however, the more recent period is one of low
and stable inﬂation.
2.1 Dynamic co-movements
While ﬁgures can be suggestive, their interpretation leaves much to the dis-
cretion of the viewer. To conﬁrm that our interpretation is valid, we conduct
a more formal analysis. We follow the literature by treating inﬂation as an
I(0) process. This makes documenting a common pattern in inﬂation rates
more complicated as it is diﬃcult to talk about trends with respect to station-
ary series. In order to address this issue, we employ a measure of dynamic
co-movements due to Croux, Forni and Reichlin (2001).
Correlation is often used in the literature on business cycles to measure
co-movement between time series. Correlation measures, however, are static
and do not capture the dynamics in the co-movement between diﬀerent time
series. Moreover measures of static correlation do not discriminate between co-
movements at diﬀerent frequencies, thus fail to establish whether co-movements
are driven by high frequency components of the data or by a common trend.
Croux, Forni and Reichlin (2001) propose a measure of dynamic co-movement
between time series which they have labeled dynamic correlation in the bivari-
ate case, and cohesion in the case of more than two time series. Their measure
of dynamic correlation is a study of the co-movements of diﬀerent time series by
frequency. We use this technique to describe the dynamic correlation between
inﬂation in the U.S and the rest of the OECD countries. We are particularly
interested in the correlation at low and business cycles frequencies.
The dynamic correlation measures the correlation between the xt and yt at






where sx(ω), sy(ω) denote the power spectrum of xt and yt respectively and
cxy is the real part of the co-spectrum between x and y. Similar to a classical
correlation coeﬃcient, this dynamic correlation measure takes values between
-1 and 1.
We compute the dynamic correlation of inﬂation between the U.S. and the
other OECD countries in our sample and these are shown in Figures 4-6. The
ﬁgures plot the correlation of national inﬂation to U.S. inﬂation at diﬀerent
frequencies. The dotted vertical lines in the ﬁgures correspond to business
cycles frequencies commonly deﬁned between 6 (π/3) and 32 (π/16) quarters.
Low frequency, or long-run, movements are to the left of the frequency line
π/16.9 The section that is to the right of frequency π/3 describes short-run
(mostly seasonality) co-movements. We do not pay any attention to this part
of the spectrum.
The main result of these tests is that dynamic correlation peaks at low
frequency, that is within the frequency band [0,π/16], for all countries except
Switzerland and Japan. The dynamic correlation takes its highest value of
around 0.7 at very low frequencies. In most cases, the peak is reached near
the frequency zero. This indicates that low frequency, or long run, movements
in inﬂation across OECD countries have closely mirrored the long-run move-
ments in U.S. inﬂation. At business cycles frequencies, that is at frequencies
[π/16,π/3], the dynamic correlation is lower for all countries. The dynamic
correlation declines in most cases and is low at frequencies corresponding to 6
quarters or more.
The positive and high dynamic correlation values at low frequencies be-
tween U.S inﬂation and other OECD countries reveal that there is indeed a
common long-run trend in OECD inﬂation rates. This suggests, though ob-
9Note that if the spectral density at frequency zero has rank one, the two processes are
cointegrated.
7viously does not necessitate, that there is a common cause of the rise in the
1970s and the subsequent fall in the 1980s of inﬂation across OECD countries.
3 Model Speciﬁcation and Identiﬁcation
Can the common inﬂation trends discussed in the previous section be ex-
plained by common changes in the conduct of monetary policy? We address
this question by ﬁrst assuming that central bank behavior has a systematic
component that can be described by a relatively parsimonious monetary policy
reaction function that relates monetary policy variables to macroeconomic fac-
tors. In particular, we adopt the widely used Taylor type formulation for the
policy reaction function.10 We attempt to describe the behavior of monetary
policy makers by estimating the parameters of this policy reaction function.
The use of this approach has been recently criticized, perhaps most tellingly
by Cochrane (2007). Cochrane argues that it is simply impossible to iden-
tify structural monetary policy parameters through using single equations ap-
proaches to estimate parameters of a Taylor rule when the underlying DGP
takes the form of a New-Keynesian type model. The essential problem is that
New Keynesian models determine only expected inﬂation rather than actual,
ex-post inﬂation. The consequence of this is that these models generically
exhibit multiple equilibria, and the monetary policy rule determines current
inﬂation through its inﬂuence on oﬀ the equilibrium path behavior. Taylor rule
parameters in these models must be chosen to rule out bubble equilibria, which
then forces the actual rate of inﬂation to jump to the unique level which is
consistent with non-bubble outcomes. Since monetary policy in these models
works only through inﬂuencing oﬀ the equilibrium path behavior, it is essen-
tially impossible to identify monetary policy parameters based on observing
equilibrium outcomes.
Cochrane’s analysis focuses on purely forward looking versions of the New
10This kind of reaction function has been shown to closely track interest rate behavior
in the U.S. (Taylor 1993) as well as in other OECD countries, at least for recent decades
(Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gerlter (1998)).
8Keynesian framework. These models, however, do not ﬁt the data well. Mod-
els in this literature that ﬁt more closely the data, tend to incorporate addi-
tional elements, such as inertia in price setting, rule of thumb behavior, and
habit formation in consumption. This results in a hybrid model containing
both backward and forward looking elements.11 These models have become
increasingly common in the New Keynesian literature of monetary policy be-
cause they allow the modeler to capture important aspects of the data, such
as output and inﬂation persistence. Purely forward looking models, like those
used by earlier modelers working in the New Keynesian framework, are unable
to replicate these features.12
It is not clear that the identiﬁcation problem highlighted by Cochrane for
purely forward looking models carries through to the hybrid models. Essen-
tially, in backwards or partially backwards looking models, both historical and
expected inﬂation are determined by the model. The inertia in inﬂation in hy-
brid models limits the possibility for bubble equilibria and also implies that
inﬂation cannot jump in response to shocks but is pinned down by its past his-
tory. Essentially, the presence of higher order dynamics in the model and data,
namely persistence in inﬂation and/or output, opens up the possibility that
structural monetary policy parameters can be recovered from observations of
equilibrium outcomes.13
Recent work by Carillo (2008) has examined this issue. He shows that, in
the case where the Taylor rule is stated in terms of contemporaneous inﬂation
and output, the inability to identify monetary policy parameters is particular
to purely forward looking models. In backward looking and hybrid models,
however, single equation estimation approaches can accurately recover the
structural parameters of the monetary policy rule. In what follows, we show
that this conclusion can be extended to a widely used Taylor rule speciﬁcation
11McCallum and Nelson (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Mankiw and Reis
(2002), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
12For inﬂation persistence, see Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), and
Rudd and Whelan (2006). For output persistence see Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004).
13This resembles what is already known for purely backward looking models: higher order
dynamics on the regressors or instruments are necessary in order to identify structural
parameters (Carare and Tchaidze (2005)).
9that includes expected future inﬂation as well as lagged values of the nominal
interest rate.
3.1 Monte Carlo Experiment
The model we use for our Monte Carlo experiment is a hybrid New Key-
nesian model that features backward and forward-looking expectations. The
framework is a small scale structural model and is very similar to the models
currently used by policy-makers for forecasting and policy evaluation. Our
model is similar to Amato and Laubach (2003) and Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and
Vall´ es (2004). We assume that the economy is populated by households, two
types of ﬁrms; ﬁrms that produce diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and a per-
fectly competitive ﬁrm that produces a ﬁnal good and a central bank that
conducts monetary policy using a Taylor rule. The model is comprised of
optimizing as well as rule of thumb consumers and producers.
The log-linearized conditions for the hybrid IS and Phillips curve are given
by equations 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Equation 3.4 describes the monetary
policy rule of the central bank. We assume that the central bank uses a partial
adjustment rule, that is one with interest rate smoothing. Potential output in
the model is assumed for simplicity to follow an AR(1) process and equation
3.6 describes the various shocks of the model. The model is described by the
following equations:
yt = (1 − δ)yt−1 + δEtyt+1 −
1
˜ σ
(it − Etπt+1) + ǫy,t (3.2)
πt = φ
fEtπt+1 + φ
bπt−1 + ˜ κ(yt − ¯ yt) + ǫπ,t (3.3)
it = ρ1it−1 + ρ2it−2 +[1 − ρ1 − ρ2][con + γ(yt − ¯ yt) + βπt+1]+ ξi,t(3.4)
¯ yt = η¯ yt−1 +  t (3.5)
ǫj,t = θjǫj,t−1 + ηj,t for j ∈ {y,π,i} (3.6)
where Et is the expectations operator, conditional on the information set at
date t, and yt,it and πt are respectively output, the nominal interest rate and
inﬂation, each expressed as deviations form their steady-state values. The con
term is equal to ¯ r − (β − 1)¯ π where ¯ r and ¯ pi are respectively the equilibrium
10real interest rate and an inﬂation target. Potential output is denoted by ¯ yt
and we assume for simplicity that it follows and AR(1) process. The errors in
the model are all serially correlated with the variance of ηj,t given by σ2
j,t.
The coeﬃcients δ, ˜ σ,φf,φb and ˜ κ can be written as functions of ﬁve struc-
tural parameters of the underlying optimization problems that generate the
reduced form model given above. These structural parameters are the propor-
tion of households that are optimizers, the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion in consumption, the discount factor, the proportion of ﬁrms that cannot
change their prices and the proportion of ﬁrms that reset their prices to last
period’s prices.14
We calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency using the parameter values
of Amato and Laubach (2003). For the baseline case, the discount factor is set
to 0.96, implying a steady-state real rate of return of 4%. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is set to 1, implying logarithmic utility for consump-
tion. We set the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers to 0.5. Regarding
price-setters, we assume that the fraction of ﬁrms that do not reset prices, is
0.5, implying that on average, prices are assumed to be sticky for two quarters.
Finally, we set the proportion of ﬁrms that are rule of thumb to 0.5. These
values imply that φf = 0.49 and φb = 0.51. We set β = 1.5 and γ = 0.5
as the baseline values for the interest rate rule as in the Taylor rule. The
coeﬃcients for the interest smoothing ρ1 and ρ2 are set respectively to 0.6 and
0.15 following values typically found in the literature. In the baseline case, we
assume that the shock processes are i.i.d.. We relax this assumption when we
perform some sensitivity tests. The variance of the shocks are calibrated using
the same values as Carillo (2008) where {σy,t,σπ,t,σi,t} = {0.23,0.14,0.24}.
3.2 Simulation and estimation
The Monte Carlo experiment is carried out by simulating the above model
by generating 10,000 samples of 500 observations of output, inﬂation and the
nominal interest rate. We then use the generated data to estimate a single-
14See Amato and Laubach (2003) for details of the derivation.
11equation policy rule of the form:
it = ρ1it−1 + ρ2it−2 + [1 − ρ1 − ρ2][con + γ(yt − ¯ yt) + βEtπt+1] + ξt (3.7)
We follow the same methodology as Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) and
use the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) to estimate equation 3.7
instead of OLS. OLS would produce biased estimates of β and γ even if we
replace the expectations of inﬂation with its contemporaneous value for at least
two reasons. Actual inﬂation is an imperfect measure of expected inﬂation
and thus substituting expected inﬂation by its actual value would likely make
the error term correlated with the future inﬂation rate (errors in variables).
Moreover, OLS is not appropriate here because of an endogeneity bias since
future inﬂation is inﬂuenced by the interest rate.
We perform the estimation using 2-step GMM on each of the 10,000 samples
of 500 observations and use four lags of output, inﬂation and interest rate and
a constant as the set of instruments.15 We then use a normal kernel density
function to estimate the probability density function of β and γ. In each case,
we check whether the mean of the reported estimated β and γ is close to the
“true” parameters of 1.5 and 0.5 respectively.
In addition to using the baseline parameter values for our hybrid model,
we also perform several sensitivity tests. We run the same Monte Carlo simu-
lations in a completely forward-looking model (δ = 1, φf = β, φb = 0) and a
completely backward-looking model (δ = 0, φf = 0, φb = 1). We also allow for
serial correlation in the disturbances of the model and redo the simulations for
the three diﬀerent versions of the model. We thus report six sets of simulation
results: our hybrid, completely backward and forward-looking models with no
serially correlated shocks and the same models with serially correlated shocks.
When serially correlated shocks are assumed, we set a mild degree of serial
correlation and set the coeﬃcient to 0.2 for all the disturbances.
15We estimate the policy rule with diﬀerent set of instruments. The results with these
diﬀerent set of instruments are very similar to our baseline case. We also estimated the
policy rule using iterative GMM. In this case also, our results are not very diﬀerent from
our baseline case.
12Our results are reported in both Table 1 and Figure 7. The table reports
the mean of the 10,000 estimates that we perform each time. The size of the
bias shows how far we are from the true value for β and γ. The standard
deviations are shown in parentheses.
The results suggest that a great deal of bias occurs when the data is gen-
erated by the purely forward looking version of the model. In this case, the
value of γ is negative while we obtain a mean estimate for β close to zero. This
is not surprising given the ﬁndings of Cochrane (2007). On the other hand,
when the data is generated by the purely backwards looking model, the size
of the bias is basically zero on both parameters. This result holds even when
we allow for serial correlation. In the hybrid model, absent serial correlation,
the size of the bias is close to zero for both parameters. However, with serial
correlation, the size of the bias on the coeﬃcient β quickly increases and is no
longer small. The size of the bias on α, on the other hand, is less aﬀected by
the introduction of serial correlation.
The main lesson that we learn from our simulations is that as long as the
shocks are not serially correlated, the coeﬃcient β can be estimated without
bias when the data generating process takes the form of our hybrid model.
This is an important result for our estimation strategy since this implies that
identiﬁcation is indeed possible as long as these conditions are met.
4 Estimation
In this section we estimate policy reaction functions of the form given by
equation 3.7 on data from 14 OECD countries. We use annualized changes
in the quarterly CPI as our measure of inﬂation. Since long time series for
quarterly GDP are not available for very many countries, we use quarterly
industrial production as our measure of economic activity. In order to generate
an estimate of the output gap, we de-trend quarterly IP using an H-P ﬁlter.16
The measure of interest rates varies across countries. We generally use short
16Alternate de-trending procedures, such as using a cubic time trend or a bandpass ﬁlter,
do not change the main results.
13term T-bill or money market rates as the measure of nominal interest rates.
For countries with multiple available short term rate series extending back far
enough, we have replicated the results with alternate measures of the nominal
interest rate.
We employ two approaches to determine where the recent period, during
which monetary policy parameters are supposed to be in the determinacy re-
gion, starts. Our ﬁrst approach to determining where the recent period begins
is to employ turning points in national inﬂation rates identiﬁed by previous
researchers.17 Our second approach is to adopt a break date commonly used
in studies of U.S. monetary policy, thought to correspond to change in the
conduct of U.S. monetary policy (1979q4). We then simply apply this break
to all countries in the sample. Table 2 reports the dates.
The policy rule with forward-looking inﬂation expectations is usually esti-
mated by replacing the unobserved expectations term, Etπt+1 by πt+1 + ǫt+1
where ǫt+1 is an expectational error that is assumed to be orthogonal to the
information set at time t. We can therefore rewrite our policy rule as:
it = ρ1it−1 + ρ2it−2 + [1 − ρ1 − ρ2][con + γ(yt − ¯ yt) + βπt+1] + et (4.8)
where et = ξt − (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)βǫt+1. The moment condition is thus given by:
E [(it − ρ1it−1 − ρ2it−2 − [1 − ρ1 − ρ2][con + γ(yt − ¯ yt) + βπt+1])Zt] = 0
(4.9)
where Zt is a vector of predetermined variables or instruments. This orthogo-
nality condition forms the basis for estimating the policy rule by GMM.
We use two lags instead of one lag on the interest rate to remove any
serial correlation from our estimation. We formally test for the presence of
serial correlation and ﬁnd that our residuals are indeed not serially correlated.
Given that our Monte Carlo simulations show that the parameters from a
single equation are well identiﬁed in a hybrid model with no serial correlation,
this increases our conﬁdence that we have indeed identiﬁed the parameters
correctly.
17The dates we use are taken from Corvoisier and Mojon (2005).
14We follow Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) and use their set of instruments.
Our instrument list includes a constant, four lags of the interest rates, four
lags of the output gap and four lags of the inﬂation rate. The instruments are
chosen based on the assumption that they are correlated with future inﬂation
and orthogonal to the error term. To obtain the variance-covariance matrix
of the moment conditions, unlike Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998) who selects
a 12-lag Newey-West estimate, we use a 4-lag Newey-West.18 We estimate
the policy rule using two alternative versions of GMM: the two-step GMM
of Hansen and Singleton(1992) and the iterative GMM approach of Hansen,
Heaton, and Yaron (1996).
As the number of instruments and hence orthogonality conditions exceed
the number of parameter estimates, the model will be overidentiﬁed. We test
the overidentifying restrictions using the J test of Hansen (1982). Under this
test, the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions on the moment
condition are valid for the vector of estimated parameters, has an asymptotic
chi-square distribution with n degrees of freedom where n is the diﬀerence
between the number of moment conditions and the number of parameters.
A rejection of these restrictions would indicate that some of these moment
conditions are not valid for the estimated parameters, thus implying that the
model is mis-speciﬁed.
In addition to testing the whole set of moment conditions, we also test
subsets of the orthogonality conditions using the Eichenbaum, Hansen and
Singleton (1988) test, usually known as the C-test. Under this test, the null
hypothesis is that the overidentifying restrictions on the moment condition in
the unrestricted model are valid whereas the alternative hypothesis postulates
that the null is not valid and the model estimated with the excluded instru-
ments is valid (the restricted model). The diﬀerence between the J-statistic
of the two models has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with degrees of
18We estimated the model also by allowing for an automatic lag selection of the Newey-
West. In most cases, the automatic selection returned a lag-length of around 4. For this
reason, we choose to ﬁx these lags at 4 in all of our regressions. The HAC regression allows
us to obtain a convergent estimator for the variance but it has no eﬀect on the values of the
estimated coeﬃcients.
15freedom equal to the number of excluded instruments. The EHS test has been
shown to have greater local power than the Hansen J-test.
We perform the EHS test by excluding one instrument at a time and then
excluding two and three instruments at a time. Our block of moment condi-
tions passes both the J-test and the EHS test. The two tests of overidentifying
restrictions do not reject the null hypothesis that all moment conditions are
correct for critical values at the 5% level. The third and fourth lagged value
of the interest rate can, however, be excluded at the 10% level but not at the
5% level. We thus proceed by estimating our model with the block moment
conditions comprising of four lags of the interest rate, output gap, inﬂation
and a constant.19
The J-test and the EHS test provide some indication on the exogeneity
of the instruments. However, the recent literature has also emphasized the
importance of testing for the relevance of the instruments in order to detect
whether they are strong or weak. Weak instruments lead to GMM (or IV)
statistics that are non-normal, thus making the point estimates, hypothesis
tests, and conﬁdence intervals unreliable. According to Stock, Wright and
Yogo (2002), in GMM, weak instruments in general is related to the weak
identiﬁcation of some or all of the unknown parameters. Although, we do not
test directly how strong or weak our set of instruments are, we provide some
sensitivity tests by estimating our model using Limited-Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) and the continuous-updating estimator (CUE) of Hansen,
Heaton and Yaron (1996). These two methods have been shown to be partially
robust to the presence of weak instruments.
4.1 Results
Table 3 presents the results, using the Corvoisier and Mojon dates to de-
termine the samples. The ﬁrst thing to observe about the results is that the
19We estimated the model with three lags of the same set of instruments and found little
diﬀerence in our results.
16Taylor rule speciﬁcation is a reasonable description of monetary policy for the
countries in the sample. To measure the ﬁt of the Taylor rule, we compare the
actual and ﬁtted values. In general, the policy rule we estimate ﬁt the data
very well.20 This is not a surprising since policy rules that incorporate a large
degree of interest rate inertia tend to ﬁt the data very well.
Furthermore, the parameters of the various Taylor rules suggest common
features to monetary policy in the countries in our sample. The coeﬃcients
on the ﬁrst lag of inﬂation are close to one, a result that is often interpreted
as evidence of interest rate smoothing, for all of the countries in the sample.
Except for Finland, all countries have positive γ coeﬃcients, and these are
statistically signiﬁcant in only 5 out of the 14 countries when we employ the
2-step and iterative GMM. Finally, all countries have positive β coeﬃcient,
and these coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerence from zero in 7 of
the 14 countries when we employ the 2-step GMM and in 9 out of 14 countries
when we use iterative GMM.
Hansen’s J-statistic suggests that we cannot reject our model speciﬁcation
for any country. However, since the sample size we use in most case is small,
this test is known to have low power in small samples. We have estimated
our model with diﬀerent block of moment conditions, especially with fewer
instruments. We do not ﬁnd any qualitatives diﬀerence in our results.
Given Equation 3.7, the Taylor principle is generally interpreted as im-
plying that, to ensure that monetary policy does not induce indeterminacy,
the coeﬃcient on expected inﬂation in the monetary policy rule should be
greater than 1. In some models, the fact that output and inﬂation are jointly
determined means that the central bank’s response to output also inﬂuences
determinacy. However, when the monetary policy reaction function exhibits
interest rate smoothing, as in our Equation 3.7, the simple Taylor principle is
both a necessary and suﬃcient restriction to ensure determinacy.21
20We do not present information concerning the ability of the policy rule to track interest
rate movements, but the results are available from the authors.
21Evans and McGough (2005) demonstrate this result in a hybrid model New Keynesian
model similar to ours. See also Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000), Table 4.
17The theory that the return to low inﬂation in the 1980s and 1990s was
driven by a renewed adherence to the Taylor principle by monetary policy
makers therefore implies that the coeﬃcient on expected inﬂation to exceed
1 in our sample. The point estimate for this coeﬃcient, which is reported in
column 5, exceeds 1 in 7 of the 14 countries in our sample when we employ a 2-
step GMM estimation (9 out of 14 when we employ iterative GMM). However,
in only 3 of these cases is the coeﬃcient statistically signiﬁcantly larger than
1 when we estimate our model using 2-step GMM (France, Italy and the US)
and in only 4 cases if we use iterative GMM (France, Italy, Ireland and the
U.S).
One of the 3-4 countries for which β exceeds 1 with statistical signiﬁcance
is the U.S. This is the well known result of Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000).
Of the other 13 countries22 that experienced the low inﬂation of the 1980s and
1990s, there is statistical evidence for adherence to the Taylor principle in the
post 1980 period only for 2-3 countries: France, Italy and (depending on the
estimation method used) Ireland.
Table 5 presents our results when we employ 1979q4 as a common break
date. This date is thought to represent a change in the conduct of monetary
policy in the U.S and coincides with the arrival of Paul Volcker as chairman
of the Fed and the start of strong dis-inﬂationary policies in the U.S. Our
results using this common break date provide even less support for the New
Keynesian story that the fall in inﬂation was due to the adherence to the
Taylor principle. Only 5 countries have a value of β that exceeds one and only
the U.S has a coeﬃcient of β that is statistically larger than one. Corvoisier
and Mojon (2005) ﬁnd that the turning point in inﬂation in most countries
occurred well after 1979. This may explain why we ﬁnd even less support for
the New Keynesian story when we use this common break date since the break
in monetary policy happened much later.
Our results provide little support for the hypothesis that the fall in inﬂation
in the 1980s and 1990s was due to a return to determinacy and an adherence
22Or perhaps 12, if Sweden’s episode of high inﬂation in the early 1990s disqualiﬁes it.
18to the Taylor principle that central banks failed to follow prior to this period.
Excluding the U.S., we ﬁnd that the point estimate for β exceeds one in about
half of the countries in the sample. However, the coeﬃcient is statistically
larger than one only in 2-3 countries. Overall, the New Keynesian explanation
of the fall of inﬂation ﬁts the U.S data well but fails to perform well when
confronted to international evidence.23
4.2 Robustness
It is well-known that eﬃcient GMM estimation has the advantage of con-
sistency in the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity, but the ﬁnite sample
performance is poor. Recent research suggest that although the continuous-
updating estimator (CUE) of Hansen, Heaton and Yaron (1996) and Lim-
ited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) oﬀer no diﬀerence in eﬃciency
asymptotically, it can perform better than the 2-step and iterative GMM in
the presence of small sample and weak instruments. We therefore estimate our
model using these two methods and verify that our results are robust to this
change in estimation method. Since we are specifying a linear model, CUE-
GMM is asymptotically equivalent to LIML under conditions of homoskedas-
ticity. We ﬁnd that in most cases, our estimation results from the CUE-GMM
is identical to LIML.24
Our results are reported in Table 6. The main conclusion here is that our
results are not substantively changed. The coeﬃcient on inﬂation is statisti-
cally bigger than one, a condition needed for determinacy, in only a handful
of countries. The three GMM procedures and the LIML however produce dif-
ferent standard errors. In general smaller standard errors are obtained with
the CUE-GMM and the LIML compared to the 2-step and iterative GMM.
23We have also estimated our model with a common break date, 1979Q4. This date
corresponds to the start of Paul Volcker at the Fed and is regarded as the beginning of a
new monetary policy regime. Our results are similar to the baseline case. They are available
on request.
24Although, we ﬁnd that for a vast majority of countries the results from the CUE-GMM
and LIML are similar, the standard errors under LIML are larger in most cases.
19Based on these results, we again conclude that there is little support for the
hypothesis that a renewed adherence to the Taylor principle explains the fall
of inﬂation in recent decades.
Since our measures of dynamic correlation reveal that U.S inﬂation is highly
correlated with the inﬂation of the other countries at low frequency, we use
the current and lagged values of U.S inﬂation as instruments and restimate
our model for all countries except the U.S. Using U.S inﬂation as instrument
imply that the latter is assumed to be correlated with future inﬂation in these
countries as well as well as satisfying the condition of exogeneity. In addition to
current and lagged values of U.S inﬂation, we also use four lags of the country’s
output-gap and the country’s interest rate as instruments. Our results are very
similar to the baseline case. We have evidence to reject the New Keynesian
story that the fall in inﬂation was caused by good monetary policy.
5 Conclusion
Our paper investigated the hypothesis that the fall of inﬂation was driven
by renewed adherence to the Taylor principle by examining the experience of a
number of OECD countries which have experienced similar inﬂation outcomes
in recent decades. The test we proposed was a relatively weak test because: i)
we could only test the implications of the theory for the fall of inﬂation, and
not the rise, ii) we cannot rule out the possibility that indeterminate monetary
policy might yield parameter estimates that look like the Taylor principle is
satisﬁed, and iii) with positive trend inﬂation, satisfying the Taylor principle
requires a stronger response to expected inﬂation than our test imposes. De-
spite the relative weakness of the test we apply, we ﬁnd that the theory is not
capable of explaining the cross country data. The results, therefore, consti-
tute fairly serious support for the view that the behavior of inﬂation in OECD
countries in recent decades is not largely driven by the impact of monetary
policy on expected inﬂation.
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γ bias β bias
i.i.d. shocks
Baseline 0.5 0.00 1.52 0.02
(0.20) (0.40)
Backward-Looking 0.50 0.00 1.51 0.01
(0.08) (0.07)
Forward-Looking -0.50 -1.00 0.05 -1.45
(0.05) (0.05)
Serial correlation
Baseline 0.48 -0.02 1.25 -0.25
(0.21) (0.37)
Backward-Looking 0.50 0.00 1.51 0.01
(0.08) (0.08)
Forward-Looking -0.41 -0.91 0.21 -1.29
(0.21) (0.37)
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* No break date available between 1971 and 1989. We use 1982:1 as the start
of the sample in these cases.
26Table 3. Two Stage GMM, Corvoisier and Mojon sample
Country con ρ1 ρ2 γ β J-stat
Australia 3.82a 1.05a −0.16c 1.05c 0.83 6.20
(0.89) (0.10) (0.09) (0.47) (0.20) p=0.63
Canada 3.41b 0.92a -0.17 0.35c 1.42 7.16
(1.02) (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.36) p=0.52
Denmark 3.46 1.23a −0.24b 0.87 1.73 3.72
(5.15) (0.12) (0.11) (1.25) (2.20) p=0.88
Finland 4.09 1.26a −0.25a -0.21 0.56 6.36
(3.76) (0.05) (0.05) (0.71) (1.80) p=0.61
France 0.83 0.80a 0.07 0.74 2.82f 7.03
(1.94) (0.20) (0.13) (0.52) (0.91) p=0.53
Germany 2.59b 1.32a −0.38a 0.83b 0.86 5.29
(1.19) (0.08) (0.07) (0.39) (0.34) p=0.73
Ireland 2.84b 0.94a -0.15 0.03 1.98 10.07
(1.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.42) p=0.26
Italy -3.88 0.74a 0.19a 2.16 2.34e 5.13
(4.29) (0.08) (0.07) (1.44) (0.63) p=0.74
Japan -6.06 1.37a −0.37a 2.18 3.17 6.27
(11.41) (0.10) (0.10) (2.96) (3.98) p=0.46
Netherlands 2.30 1.35a −0.38a 1.32 0.85 6.52
(2.73) (0.07) (0.06) (1.11) (1.03) p=0.64
Spain 5.20b 0.93a -0.11 0.21 0.99 4.76
(1.97) (0.11) (0.15) (0.42) (0.34) p=0.78
Sweden 5.75 1.00a -0.03 2.86 0.77 6.71
(4.28) (0.10) (0.07) (5.69) (0.84) p=0.57
Switzerland 1.67 1.08a -0.14 0.75b 0.66 7.77
(1.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.35) (0.40) p=0.46
U.K. 3.96a 1.08a −0.16a 1.04 0.83 7.89
(1.42) (0.07) (0.06) (0.87) (0.27) p=0.44
U.S. 3.88a 1.00a -0.13 0.74b 1.74e 7.23
(1.51) (0.06) (0.05) (0.34) (0.37) p=0.51
a, b, c: statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
d, e, f: statistically signiﬁcantly greater than one at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
27Table 4. Iterative GMM, Corvoisier and Mojon sample
Country con ρ1 ρ2 γ β J-stat
Australia 3.85a 1.08a −0.19c 1.03b 0.81 5.92
(0.87) (0.10) (0.10) (0.45) (0.20) p=0.66
Canada 3.33a 0.89a -0.15 0.34b 1.46 5.34
(1.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.39) p=0.72
Denmark 4.97 1.30a −0.31a 0.57 1.10 4.31
(3.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.80) (1.25) p=0.78
Finland 3.87a 1.15a −0.12b -0.11 0.50 6.28
(1.25) (0.06) (0.06) (0.26) (0.72) p=0.62
France 0.28 0.50a 0.32a 0.77b 3.11d 6.35
(1.34) (0.17) (0.11) (0.38) (0.63) p=0.61
Germany 2.04 1.21a −0.26a 1.18c 0.80 4.77
(1.66) (0.09) (0.09) (0.64) (0.43) p=0.78
Ireland 1.33 1.34a −0.56a -0.00 2.56d 5.83
(1.51) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.52) p=0.66
Italy -3.88 0.74a 0.19b 2.16 2.34e 5.14
(4.30) (0.08) (0.07) (1.44) (0.63) p=0.74
Japan -7.09 1.36a −0.37a 2.59 3.84 6.32
(15.62) (0.10) (0.10) (4.21) (5.74) p=0.51
Netherlands 2.00 1.38a −0.41a 1.07 1.14 6.12
(2.74) (0.07) (0.07) (1.03) (1.09) p=0.64
Spain 4.90a 1.13a −0.36b 0.07 1.09 3.99
(1.46) (0.14) (0.15) (0.29) (0.24) p=0.65
Sweden 5.75 1.00a -0.03 2.87 0.77 6.71
(4.27) (0.10) (0.08) (5.87) (0.84) p=0.57
Switzerland 1.49 1.07a -0.12 0.90c 0.60 7.16
(1.49) (0.10) (0.10) (0.47) (0.48) p=0.52
U.K. 4.32a 1.15b −0.23a 0.87 0.74 7.46
(1.31) (0.08) (0.07) (0.85) (0.29) p=0.49
U.S. 3.47a 1.14a −0.24b 0.39 2.14d 4.58
(1.71) (0.12) (0.10) (0.36) (0.43) p=0.73
a, b, c: statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
d, e, f: statistically signiﬁcantly greater than one at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
28Table 5. Two Stage GMM, 1979:4 as break date
Country con ρ1 ρ2 γ β J-stat
Australia 3.82a 1.05a −0.16c 1.05c 0.83 6.20
(0.89) (0.10) (0.09) (0.47) (0.20) p=0.63
Canada 4.14a 0.86a −0.12c 0.35b 1.17 7.91
(0.69) (0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.14) p=0.44
Denmark 4.16a 1.24a −0.29a 0.62 0.56 5.55
(1.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.53) (1.25) p=0.70
Finland 3.93 1.23a −0.24a 0.44 0.34 7.13
(3.93) (0.05) (0.05) (1.06) (0.73) p=0.52
France 4.98a 1.19a −0.24a 0.44 0.34 7.13
(1.70) (0.08) (0.06) (0.69) (0.36) p=0.38
Germany 2.59b 1.16a −0.23b 1.02b 0.51 5.41
(1.29) (0.11) (0.11) (0.46) (0.43) p=0.71
Ireland 6.81a 0.90a -0.06 0.42c 0.56 7.36
(0.90) (0.09) (0.09) (0.24) (0.10) p=0.50
Italy 0.25 0.73a 0.19a 2.08 1.41 8.00
(4.10) (0.07) (0.07) (1.28) (0.39) p=0.43
Japan -5.44 1.46a −0.47a 3.91 3.81 7.09
(20.96) (0.10) (0.09) (8.67) (8.80) p=0.52
Netherlands 2.48 1.42a −0.44a 3.73 0.34 7.08
(3.50) (0.15) (0.14) (2.99) (1.36) p=0.53
Spain 4.78c 0.73a 0.09 0.49 1.00 6.60
(2.82) (0.10) (0.10) (0.52) (0.43) p=0.58
Sweden 5.75 1.00a -0.03 2.86 0.77 6.71
(4.28) (0.10) (0.07) (5.69) (0.84) p=0.57
Switzerland 1.67 1.08a -0.14 0.75b 0.66 7.77
(1.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.35) (0.40) p=0.46
U.K. 3.81a 1.05a −0.14b 1.26 0.82 9.00
(1.33) (0.06) (0.06) (0.77) (0.17) p=0.34
U.S. 1.78 0.95a -0.09 0.70b 1.54e 7.33
(1.19) (0.06) (0.06) (0.29) (0.27) p=0.50
a, b, c: statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
d, e, f: statistically signiﬁcantly greater than one at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
29Table 6. CUE-GMM, Corvoisier and Mojon sample
Country con ρ1 ρ2 γ β J-stat
Australia 3.95a 1.14a −0.24b 1.01b 0.77 5.82
(0.86) (0.11) (0.10) (0.44) (0.20) p=0.66
Canada 2.79a 0.84a -0.16 0.28c 1.64f 4.89
(1.00) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.33) p=0.72
Denmark 5.29c 0.96a 0.01 0.79 1.22 3.79
(2.77) (0.15) (0.15) (0.90) (1.29) p=0.88
Finland 3.34a 1.14a −0.12c -0.21 0.67 6.16
(1.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.24) (0.56) p=0.63
France 0.65 -1.27 1.60b 1.12a 2.93d 5.37
(1.16) (0.88) (0.62) (0.35) (0.47) p=0.72
Germany 1.84 1.16a −0.22b 1.18c 0.84 4.65
(1.60) (0.09) (0.09) (0.60) (0.40) p=0.72
Ireland 1.13 1.45a −0.66a -0.09 2.74d 5.57
(1.66) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.59) p=0.66
Italy -1.29 0.70a 0.22b 1.86 1.93e 5.03
(2.90) (0.07) (0.07) (1.20) (0.44) p=0.75
Japan -11.38 1.49a −0.49a 5.48 7.78 6.10
(13.79) (0.10) (0.10) (5.64) (9.90) p=0.46
Netherlands 2.39 1.38a −0.41a -0.17 1.63 5.79
(2.91) (0.07) (0.07) (1.04) (1.24) p=0.69
Spain 5.21a 1.12a −0.39a -0.06 1.09 3.73
(1.36) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.22) p=0.68
Sweden 4.48 1.04a -0.07 2.33 0.77 6.44
(3.58) (0.10) (0.08) (3.62) (0.64) p=0.60
Switzerland 0.55 1.10a -0.13 1.33 0.56 6.93
(3.06) (0.11) (0.10) (1.06) (0.82) p=0.54
U.K. 4.94a 1.27a −0.33a 1.16 0.57 7.16
(1.76) (0.10) (0.09) (1.18) (0.44) p=0.52
U.S. 3.40b 1.21a −0.30a 0.28 2.26d 4.36
(1.70) (0.15) (0.12) (0.38) (0.48) p=0.72
a, b, c: statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
d, e, f: statistically signiﬁcantly greater than one at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
30Figure 1: Inﬂation trends - pairwise with the U.S
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31Figure 2: Inﬂation trends - pairwise with the U.S
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32Figure 3: Inﬂation trends - pairwise with the U.S
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34Figure 5: Dynamic correlation with the U.S





















































































































































































35Figure 6: Dynamic correlation with the U.S


































































36Figure 7: Monte Carlo Densities
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